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A number of studies have tested economic models of household decision-making, yet 
there is no consensus regarding which is most appropriate for practical application. 
One area where the choice of household decision model has potentially important 
implications is the valuation of child health or safety.  Few child health valuation 
studies have investigated household decision-making models, typically adopting the 
simplifying  unitary  model.  This  study  aims  to  determine  the  implications  of 
household decision making models on the magnitude of a child safety premium. To 
achieve this, a stated preference survey is conducted amongst farm households in 
Northern Ireland to ascertain mothers and fathers individual preferences regarding 
the value of reducing the risk of non-fatal farm accidents to their child relative to 
themselves. A number of interesting results emerge. Firstly, no significant difference 
is  found  between  child  values  elicited  from  mothers  and  fathers.  Secondly,  the 
premium, which suggests that fathers are willing to pay twice as much for their child 
than  self,  is  consistent  with  previous  findings.  Finally,  the  affect  of  different 
household models on the value of the premium will be investigated. Results show that 
the premium magnitude varies, with midpoint values of 1.25 from the bargaining 
model, 1.5 from the collective model and 2 from the unitary model.   2 
I  Introduction 
 
The child health premium refers to the notion that society values the health or safety 
of a child over that of an adult and, by implication, is willing to pay more to prevent 
the same illness or reduce the same risk. This concept is becoming increasingly 
accepted in the health policy arena. For example in the United States, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency published guidelines for the analysis of policies 
that affect child health risks (USEPA, 2003). Meanwhile, the European Union, backed 
by the World Health Organisation, has launched a major policy initiative through the 
European Child Safety Alliance (ECSA) to establish national Child Safety Action 
Plans in 18 European countries. Other examples which indicate societys aversion to 
child related risks include the introduction of speed ramps outside schools in the UK, 
the promotion of pool alarms and fencing to prevent occurrences of children drowning 
in the US, promotion of sun protection including protective clothing, high factor 
creams and 100 percent UV filter sunglasses in Australia.  
 
To ensure the benefits of accident prevention policies are not underestimated, child 
health effects should be incorporated into economic analyses assessing health or 
safety policies. If a premium for child safety exists, separate evaluation of health or 
safety policies which impact children will be necessary to ensure such a project is 
potentially Pareto improving. Support for the occurrence of such a premium is 
exclusively based on parental values (Crocker & Agee, 2001; Dickie & Messman, 
2004), predominantly mothers, who may have greater responsibility for the well 
being of the child (e.g. Joyce et al, 1989; Carlin & Sandy, 1991; Liu et al., 2000). 
Such studies typically report that parents are willing to pay twice as much for their 
child as self (Liu et al., 2000; Dickie & Messman, 2004). Consideration of the effect 
of the severity of injury or illness is limited. Liu et al and Dickie & Messman find that 
as number and duration of minor respiratory or cold symptoms increase, WTP 
increases at a decreasing rate.   
 
The first aim of this paper is to extend the results of earlier studies by eliciting values 
for child injuries of considerably different severities from both parents of a child. This 
allows us to empirically address previously unanswered questions such as whether the 
magnitude of the child health premium remains stable when elicited from mothers and 
fathers and for injuries of markedly different severity. 
 
Elicitation of parental values for child health/safety (justified by the assumption that 
children themselves are unable to provide rational responses) complicates standard 
analysis of individual responses due to the inter-relationships that exist within 
families. Therefore, the family household decision making structure will be an 
important consideration in the analysis of child health policies. Consequently, the 
second aim of the study is to empirically investigate the impact of imposing different 
household decision making approaches on the magnitude of the premium value that 
would be recommended for policy.  
 
Bergstroms (2003) framework provides a useful starting point to empirically 
investigate the implications of imposing different household structures on the child   3 
health premium elicited through parental willingness to pay
1and hence, on the 
resulting consequences for policy. In the unitary model (following Becker, 1974), the 
head of households (typically the fathers) willingness to pay should be adopted. 
Where parents agree on what is fair when determining a household welfare budget (as 
in the collective model, Browning & Chiappori, 1998), both willingness to pay values 
from mother and father will be the same, so either value can be adopted for child 
health valuation. Conversely, where parents do not cooperate (as in the bargaining 
model, Manser & Brown 1980), the minimum WTP value of either parent should be 
employed for child health valuation so as to adhere to the potentially Pareto 
improving criteria.  
 
Whilst pluralistic models (ie. bargaining and collective models) are thought to be 
more realistic in assuming that decisions are reached collectively, the complications 
associated with how that decision is reached reduce the plausibility of adopting this 
approach (Dickie & Gerking, 2002). Furthermore, Bateman & Munro (2005) point out 
that limitations of the data used in studies supporting pluralistic models restrict their 
ability to make reliable interpretations. Rather, the availability of information on 
household income and not wage rate may account for observed changes in 
expenditure patterns. The unitary model simplifies the task, and has been most 
frequently used in child health valuation studies for this reason. Previous studies in 
household decision making cast doubt on the credibility of the unitary model 
(Thomas, 1990; Lundberg et al, 1997; Attansio & Lechene, 2002), however, 
Bergstrom (2003) argues that it should not be dismissed, as it may still be appropriate 
in more traditional family settings. 
 
Few child health valuation studies have investigated the effect of adopting different 
household decision making models. Comparing preferences elicited from partners 
individually with preferences elicited from partners joint decisions, Dosman & 
Adamowicz (2006) and Bateman & Munro (2005) show that choice of household 
decision model could potentially have significant effects on the results and how they 
translate to policy recommendations. These studies show that individual responses 
differ significantly from joint responses, suggesting that use of unitary or collective 
models could produce quite different outcomes. However, as these studies do not 
specifically consider child welfare contexts making it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions. Dickie & Messman (2004) also found that mothers and fathers made 
similar decisions in their study which investigated parental valuation of preventing 
acute illness to self and child. However, mothers and fathers were not drawn from the 
same household, hence providing justification for this study.  
 
To achieve the aims of this study, a stated preference survey is conducted amongst 
farm households in Northern Ireland to ascertain mothers and fathers individual 
preferences regarding the value of avoiding the pain, suffering and inconvenience 
                                                 
1 Parental valuation of child health or safety is preferable since parents will usually act in the best 
interests of the child, have the means to pay, the cognitive ability to make a rational decision (which 
could occur if a value were directly elicited from affected children, Dockins et al, 2002) and to avoid 
double counting (which could occur if a value were elicited from society who ultimately pay for 
policies through taxation, Jones Lee, 1992).   4 
associated with non-fatal farm accidents to themselves and their child
2. The 
agricultural industry is reported to have the highest occupational fatality rate in 
Northern Ireland with 24.1 fatalities per 10,000 workers (HSENI, 2002). A proportion 
of reported fatalities and injuries involved children, for example, children under the 
age of 16 accounted for 5% of agricultural accidents (Magee, 2002). The farming 
scenario provides a common framework to value injuries to adults and children. 
Furthermore, this is one of the first child morbidity valuation studies to examine the 
existence of a child premium based on non-fatal injuries rather than acute illnesses.  
 
Further details on the the survey and sampling procedures are provided in the 
subsequent section. Section 3 reports results which are presented in two subsections. 
Subsection 1 indicates that there is no significant difference between mothers and 
fathers WTP to prevent an injury to their children or to themselves. Significant child 
health premiums (i.e. difference between WTP to prevent injury to child and to self) 
were not entirely consistent in all cases. Subsection 2 demonstrates the considerable 
divergence in the premium magnitude when the household decision making model is 
varied. These results suggest that the household decision making structure has the 
potential to significantly affect the magnitude of the child health premium 
recommended for policy. Further implications are discussed in the final section. 
 
II  Survey and Sampling 
 
To elicit values of safety to children, a stated preference survey was conducted 
throughout Northern Ireland. Two hundred and ninety three farms were selected using 
a three-stage approach. Firstly, geographical clusters of 3-4 electoral wards in each of 
12 rural districts (i.e. 2 per county) were selected to minimise travel distance between 
farms. 1,830 farms were identified as suitable through application of systematic 
sampling with proportional allocation in relation to six strata (3 types: Dairy; Cattle & 
Sheep; Cereal and 2 sizes: 16-40 European Size Units (ESU) and 40+ ESU). Farmers 
were then contacted by telephone to ensure that a spouse and at least one child under 
18 years resided on the farm site and that both farmer and spouse were willing to 
participate. Eighty two percent of the 1,830 farms contacted lived with their spouse on 
the farm. Of those farms, 34% had at least one child under the age of 18 years living 
on the farm
3, of which 72% were willing to participate. The final sample was selected 
to be representative of target farms in Northern Ireland according to type, size and 
county. 
 
On each farm, separate interviews were successively conducted with the farmer and 
spouse to ensure there could be no collusion concerning responses. The stated 
preference survey began with warm up questions to familiarise respondents with the 
characteristics of the injuries to be valued and with the nature of the tasks they would 
complete. In all cases, injuries were assumed to have been sustained from farm 
machinery accidents.  
 
                                                 
2 By presenting the question in terms of WTP for recovery from a certain injury that has already 
occurred, rather than WTP for a reduction in the risk of sustaining an injury, the benefit value is 
mutually exclusive. Therefore problems associated with joint product confounds are avoided. 
3 This compares with 82% of couples married and living on farms (Magee, 2002) and an anticipated 
42% who have at least one child under 18 years, based on 2001 UK Census.   5 
Following this, a willingness to pay question was presented to elicit the maximum 
amount that a respondent would be willing to pay for extra treatment (i.e. in addition 
to standard NHS treatment
4) that would return them to normal health within 3-4 days
5. 
Respondents were prompted to bear in mind what they could realistically afford and 
were informed that income loss would be covered by insurance and that no legal 
compensation for the injury would be issued. It was also emphasised that they should 
not attempt to guess the cost of the treatment.  
 
The symptoms associated with the non-fatal injuries included in the questionnaire are 
described in Table 1. Injury F is the less severe injury, which does not require a stay 
in hospital, the effects of the injury last weeks and there are no long term effects. 
Injury W necessitates a short stay in hospital, effects of the injury are felt for weeks or 
months and normal health is restored after 3-4 months.  
 
Table 1    Descriptions of non-fatal farm machinery injuries (Jones Lee et al, 1995) 
  Immediate Effects  After Effects  Long Term Effects 
Injury F  Seen as hospital 
outpatient 
·  Slight-mod pain for 2-7 days 
·  Some pain for several weeks  
·  Some limitation to normal 





·  2-7 days 
·  Slight to 
moderate pain 
After Hospital 
·  Some pain/discomfort for 
several weeks 
·  Some restrictions to work 
and/or leisure activities for 
several weeks/months 
After 3-4 months, 
return to normal 
health with no 
permanent disability 
 
Money amounts were elicited using a payment card which showed 15 amounts, 
exponentially increasing from £5 to £1million, to minimise bid range and centring 
effects Rowe et al (1996)
6. The money amounts were also presented on cards which 
the respondent was asked to sort into three piles, corresponding to amounts that they 
definitely would pay, definitely would not pay or amounts about which they were not 
sure
7. [ALBERINI PAPER] 
 
The second question in the survey sought to obtain a value of safety for a child. As 
before, parents were asked how much they were WTP for extra treatment that would 
return their child to normal health in 3-4 days, following the occurrence of a farm 
machinery accident resulting in either Injury F or W (Table 1). The WTP question 
was asked in reference to only one child, where child was defined as less than 18 
years of age. A number of procedures were employed following Dickie & Messman 
(2004). Firstly, where respondents had two or more children, one child was randomly 
selected by the interviewer. Secondly, information relating to the child was collected 
                                                 
4 This follows the methodology adopted in Carthy et al (1999) where respondents refused or found it 
difficult to indicate an amount they would be willing to pay for treatment for a road injury because in 
reality such treatment in the UK is provided free of charge by the National Health Service. 
5 A proxy for the prevention of the occurrence of a non-fatal injury. 
6 They argue that the exponential scale complies with the notion that the accuracy of respondents 
estimates are proportional to the value, with Webers Law that just noticeable differences in value 
changes increase exponentially and finally, with an observed natural error distribution in WTP values 
7 This approach was adopted to encourage respondents to consider all amounts and avoid problems 
such as anchoring, protest and non-responses, yes-saying and bid range effects.    6 
to help explain the elicited value. Finally, to prevent parents expressing altruism 
towards their child due to a concern for what the interviewer will think the severity of 
the child injury valued differed from the severity of the injury that respondents had 
previously valued for themselves.  
 
Two versions of the questionnaire were issued. Each father and mother from the same 
household completed the same version of the questionnaire in every case. The 
experimental design is illustrated in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2  Experimental Design 












Father Respondent  W  F  F  W 
Mother Respondent  W  F  F  W 
 
Conventional parametric analysis relies on strict assumptions regarding the 
underlying distribution of responses. Analysis will be accurate only if the correct 
functional form is specified. Where these assumptions do not necessarily hold for 
example due to random sampling, or as is typical in the case of morbidity valuation, 
the Turnbull estimator offers a non-parametric approach to calculating the mean and 
median willingness to pay estimate.  
 
Within non-market valuation, the Turnbull estimator (Turnbull 1974, 1976) has been 
most commonly applied to discrete choice contingent valuation (Kristrom, 1990) 
Carson et al, 1994; Haab & McConnell, 1997). Haab & McConnell (2002) also 
outline how the Turnbull estimator can be applied to payment card data. Due to the 
nature of the payment card where every respondent is presented with every bid level, 
the cumulative density function is assured to be monotonically increasing, so long as 
every bid on the scale was indicated by some respondent as their lower bound WTP. 
Bids that were not selected should be eliminated to ensure monotonicity. Haab & 
McConnell show that a standard mean calculation is exactly equivalent to the 
Turnbull lower bound mean. 
 
 
IV  Results  
 
The results are reported in two parts. Subsection 1 reports values elicited from 
mothers and fathers representing WTP to prevent the occurrence of injuries F and W 
to self and child (henceforth denoted WTPFSELF, WTPFCHILD, WTPWSELF, 
WTPWCHILD) (Table 3). These values are firstly analysed to test for statistically 
significant difference between mothers responses compared to fathers responses. 
This illustrates whether the choice of household member has any effect on the value 
of the household commodity. The paired t-test for two related samples is used to take 
into account household effects. Secondly, t-tests are carried out to examine whether 
there are significant differences between how parents value their own safety relative 
to their childs safety to establish a significant child health premium.  
   7 
Subsection 2 determines the impact of the choice of household decision making 
model on the magnitude of the premium value that would be recommended for policy. 
The premium value is calculated by dividing the WTPCHILD by WTPSELF for each 
household and then calculating a mean across all households. Whether mothersor 
fathers WTP values or some combination are used to calculate the premium, will 




Table 3  Mothers and Fathers WTP for Prevention of Injuries to Self and Child  
  n  Mean (£)  SE (£)  Median (£) 
WTPFSELF   143  756.57  43.49  250 
WTPFCHILD  149  2470.74  226.17  500 
WTPWSELF  149  2555.17  207.05  500 
Mother  
WTPWCHILD  143  3384.06  254.45  1,500 
WTPFSELF  141  1233.58  287.29  250 
WTPFCHILD  149  1466.28  271.89  250 
WTPWSELF  150  1985.87  222.95  500 
Father 
WTPWCHILD  143  2740.56  232.54  1,500 
 
Paired t-tests reveal there is no significant difference between mothers and fathers 
mean WTP values for child safety for either injury (Injury F: t = 1.245, p = 0.215; 
Injury W: t = -1.142, p = 0.255) which suggests that from a policy perspective, a 
value for child safety on farms could be obtained from either parent. There is also no 
significant difference between mothers and fathers values for their own safety for 
either injury (Injury F: t = -1.411, p = 0.160; Injury W: t = -0.985, p = 0.326). 
 
Mothers values are found to be significantly higher for their child than for self at the 
5% level in both injury cases (Injury F: t = 7.443; Injury W: t =2.527). When the 
same tests are replicated on fathers values, which are also higher for child than self in 
both injury cases, the difference is significant only for the more severe injury, W 
(Injury F: t = 0.588; Injury W: t = 2.343). These results show that parents appear to 
be considering the value of improved safety for specific members of the family, i.e. 
self or child rather than applying a constant value which represents WTP to avoid the 
injury. They support the existence of a significant child health premium. 
 
Due to the specialised nature of the sample, i.e. farming parents of children aged up to 
18 years, we found little variation in explanatory variables such as age of parent. 
Covariate analysis on WTP revealed that as income was positively significant. This 
lends credibility to the results.  
 
Subsection 2 
The child health premium magnitude is calculated for each household decision 
making model as follows: 
 
1.  Unitary Model:   The head of household is the dictator so his or her 
values are adopted. The head of the household would traditionally be the 
father, however, in todays modern society, it is just as plausible that the head 
could be the mother. Therefore, the premium is calculated for both cases.  
   8 
1a.       Unitary Premium: Father = Father WTPSELF / Father WTPCHILD   
1b.       Unitary Premium: Mother = Mother WTPSELF / Mother WTPCHILD 
 
2.  Collective model:  Parents cooperate therefore household averages are 
utilised. 
 
Premium = Average of Mother & Father WTPSELF / Average of Mother &      
Father WTPCHILD 
 
3.  Bargaining model:  The minimum value in the household would be utilised 
to calculate the premium in order to ensure Pareto efficiency following 
Bergstroms principle discussed in the introduction.  
 
Premium = Minimum of Mother & Father WTPSELF / Minimum of Mother &      
Father WTPCHILD 
 
Table 4 summarises the magnitude of premiums calculated using the different 
approaches described above.   
 
Table 4   
   
Injury F  Injury W 
Model  Calculation (£)  Premium  Model  Calculation (£)  Premium 
Unitary: 
Father 
1466.28/1233.58  1.2  Unitary: 
Father 
2740.56/1985.87  1.4 
Unitary: 
Mother 
2470.74/756.57  3.3  Unitary: 
Mother 
3384.06/2555.17  1.3 
Collective 
 
1,975.05/995.08  2.0  Collective 
 
3,050.07/2,270.37  1.3 
Bargaining 
 
602.97/426.89  1.4  Bargaining 
 
1,280.77/983.67  1.3 
 
V  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Evidence for the existence of a significant child safety premium reported by parents 
supports the majority of other parental valuation studies (eg. Liu et al, 2000). 
Statistical tests comparing values elicited for self and child show that mothers 
premiums are significant for both injuries and fathers premiums are only significant 
for the more severe injury. Values of child safety are most frequently elicited from 
mothers and so the finding that mothers have a consistently significant premium 
complies with the studies previously discussed (Liu et al, 2000; Carlin & Sandy, 
1991; Joyce et al, 1989). The finding that fathers only have a significant premium for 
the more severe injury is perhaps not surprising, given that all fathers included in the 
sample were farmers who are likely to be very familiar with minor injuries and 
perhaps have a more realistic perspective of the effects that such a minor injury has. 
Their attitude towards these minor injuries is likely to be less cautious. 
 
The finding of no significant difference between mothers and fathers values on both 
child injuries are consistent with the results in Dupont (2001) who found no 
significant difference between mothers and fathers WTP to improve the   9 
environmental status of a local harbour used for recreation. In addition, Bateman & 
Munro (2005) could not reject the hypothesis of no difference between male and 
female partners WTP for a reduction in dietary health risks. Other studies have 
shown that the preferences of males and females differ significantly (Dosman & 
Adamowicz, 2003). However, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from 
studies that do not specifically consider matters related to child welfare. This study 
provides the first attempt at addressing this issue. Results suggest that either parent 
will provide an accurate estimate for child health/safety valuation.  
 
It is not evident that the results produced in this study will apply to other child welfare 
related matters. The primary reason for this is that where mothers may have greater 
responsibility for the well being of the child within a non farm household (e.g. Liu et 
al, 2000), the context examined in this study involves the father to a greater extent, 
given that the risks faced by the child arise from the fathers workplace, i.e. the farm, 
for which he has responsibility. In this way, both parents are accountable for the well 
being of the child in this specific scenario. In addition, it may be that mothers and 
fathers may value their own health or safety differently in other circumstances and 
this will affect the premium value. More studies comparing child values obtained 
from individual parents within the same household should be carried out to provide 
stronger evidence that a consistent valuation of child health or safety premium can be 
elicited from either parent for policy purposes. 
 
Investigation of the effect of estimating the premium through application of 
Bergstroms alternative household decision models to the results obtained in this 
study show that the premium exists in each case. However, variation in the 
magnitudes of the premium could substantially affect the value adopted for policies 
related to child health or safety. A child health premium calculated using the head of 
households premium (assumed to be the father) would result in a premium of 
between 1.2 (Injury F) to 1.4 (injury W). However, if the mothers value were used, as 
is common in child health valuation studies, a mid point of 2.3 is similar to the 
magnitude reported in previous studies, which typically state that parents are willing 
to pay twice as much for their child (Liu et al, 2000; Dickie & Ulery, 2001; Dickie & 
Messman, 2004). However, application of the other household models result in 
smaller premium magnitudes (with midpoints of 1.65 for the collective model and 
1.35 for the bargaining model).  
 
In addition, it can be noted that the severity of injury reverses in the premium range 
when the model changes. That is, the minimum premium value is obtained from the 
less severe injury under the unitary household model but is obtained from the more 
severe injury under the other models. Closer examination reveals that if based on 
injury W, the premium varies markedly according to the adopted model from 1.2 to 
3.3. If based on injury F, it varies from 1.2 to 3.3. The variation is due to the 
substantial difference in how mothers and fathers valued the more severe injury. In 
particular, farming fathers and mothers appear to have different preferences about the 
child safety premium to attach to injury W. Given Bergstroms definition of the 
unitary, collective and bargaining models, preferences regarding injury W appear to 
drive the difference in premium between models. 
 
The implications of these findings suggest that different family structures could be 
inaccurately represented if one of these models were applied generally to represent all   10 
households. This further emphasises the need to take the family household decision 
structure into account. This paper has shown that it is practically plausible to conduct 
interviews with both parents. However, more empirical research is necessary to 
develop a protocol for two parent interviews that can reveal the actual underlying 
household decision making model. Given the inherent differences, an alternative 
approach might be to develop controlled experiments. Furthermore, it remains a 
debatable issue as to whether parents preferences best represent the value of child 
welfare, particularly if, as shown in Cockerill et al (2006), altruism toward child 
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Appendix :      
 
Response Rate 
Eleven respondents assigned a zero WTP response for Injury W and 40 for Injury F. 
Twenty-eight respondents (out of 300) were not willing to pay any amount for the 
quick recovery of their child from Injury F, whilst 14 respondents (out of 286) were 
not willing to pay for the quick recovery of their child from Injury W.  
 
There was 1 WTP non-responses for Injury W and 9 for Injury F. In addition, there 
were two non-responses for the Child Injury W question and four for Child Injury F. 
These responses were omitted from the data. 